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Introduction
This appeal comes to the Court unopposed—no one contests the
Appellants’ arguments or their underlying petitions for name- and sexchange orders. This, along with the Court’s recent opinion in In re
Gestational Agreement, 2019 UT 40, 449 P.3d 69, prompted the Court to
order supplemental briefing on three issues: (1) whether the apparent
“lack of adversariness” in this appeal deprives the Court of jurisdiction;
(2) did Utah’s constitutional framers intend the grant of judicial power
to include determining “an application seeking approval of an
amendment to a birth certificate,” and, if not, “does it resemble other
matters our state courts handled at the time of statehood”; and (3) does
Utah Code section 26-2-11 violate Utah Constitution article V or other
separation-of-powers principles?
The short answer to the first two questions is that name- or sexchange petitions are not necessarily non-adversarial proceedings and
potentially satisfy an adversariness requirement. But the Court need
not resolve that issue here because Utah courts have been exercising
jurisdiction over similar applications since at least 1888. So applying
the same analytical approach as In re Gestational Agreement based on
analogous historical evidence leads to the same conclusion: judicial

1

power under the Utah Constitution includes jurisdiction over name
change and similar applications.
The Attorney General’s Office respectfully declines to address the
third issue. Statutes are presumed to be constitutional unless clearly
shown otherwise. No one—not a single litigant or other interested
person—has challenged section 26-2-11’s constitutionality. Nor does the
statute affect the Court’s jurisdiction, which would allow the Court to
question sua sponte the provision’s constitutionality. In fact, the
statute does not require the judiciary to do anything. So section 26-2-11
raises no readily apparent separation-of-powers problem involving the
courts.
Argument
I.

Any Lack of Adversariness Does Not Deprive the Court of
Jurisdiction Over This Matter.
The Court’s supplemental briefing order notes that this case is

unopposed and therefore raises jurisdictional concerns similar to those
addressed in In re Gestational Agreement. Supp. Br. Order at 1. So the
Court first queries whether “the lack of adversariness” deprives the
Court of jurisdiction. It does not.
First, while the instant matter is unopposed, name- or sexchange proceedings are not necessarily non-adversarial. That makes
2

this case different than the proceedings for approving gestational
agreements. Those cases, the Court explained, arise in a “unique
posture” because all parties are statutorily required to “jointly file a
petition with the district court in order to validate a gestational
agreement,” which the district court may approve “only on a finding
that, among other things, ‘all parties have voluntarily entered into the
agreement and understand its terms.’” In re Gestational Agreement,
2019 UT 40, ¶ 11 (quoting Utah Code § 78B-15-803(2)(e)). “[B]y
statutory scheme,” then, “no adverse party may exist” and there can be
“no controversy between adverse parties.” In re Gestational Agreement,
2019 UT 40, ¶ 11.
That’s not the case with name- (or presumably sex-) change
proceedings. Courts may provide notice of the hearing and can grant
the name-change request only upon proof offered in open court
supporting the petition’s allegations and showing “proper cause” for the
change. Utah Code § 42-1-2. Prior versions of the statute required
public notice before the district court could grant the petition. See
Revised Statutes of Utah § 1546 (1898) (requiring proof in open court
“that thirty days’ previous notice of the [name change] hearing thereof
has been given in a newspaper published or having a general
circulation in the county”); Compiled Laws of Utah § 3863 (1888)
3

(requiring proof of publication of the name change petition for four
successive weeks in local newspaper or at “three of the most public
places in the county”).
The potential for notice of the hearing necessarily contemplates
that the petition could be challenged by any interested person. The
1888 statute expressly recognized that “objections may be filed by any
person who can, in such objections show to the court good reasons
against such change of name.” Compiled Laws § 3864. And the
possibility for a disputed proceeding may be enough to satisfy any
adversariness prerequisite to exercise judicial power.
For example, in Tutun v. United States, the United States
Supreme Court addressed whether federal appellate courts had
jurisdiction over orders denying aliens’ petitions to become United
States citizens. 270 U.S. 568, 574 (1926). Among other things, the
relevant statute required that the United States receive notice of these
citizenship petitions, but the federal government did not have to and
apparently did not always participate. Ann Woolhandler, Adverse
Interests and Article III, 111 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1025, 1061-62 (2017)
(discussing notice provisions and observing that “sometimes even
unopposed petitions that the lower court denied showed up in the
appellate courts”). The Court held that these naturalization petitions
4

presented justiciable cases or controversies because, at least in part,
the “United States is always a possible adverse party.” Tutun, 270 U.S.
at 577 (emphasis added); see also Woolhandler, Adverse Interests, 111
Nw. U. L. Rev. at 1062-63 (describing Tutun as holding that
naturalization proceedings “were sufficiently adverse to be Article III
cases for appellate review” because the “‘United States is always a
possible adverse party’” (quoting Tutun, 270 U.S. at 577)). 1
That same reasoning could apply to proceedings for name or sex
changes. The notice provisions mean there is at least a possibility for
an adverse party to object to the proposed name or sex change. In fact,
the State of Utah once filed an amicus brief in an appeal reviewing an
order denying an inmate’s name change petition. In re Cruchelow, 926
P.2d 833, 833, 835 n.3 (Utah 1996). The State appears to have been
defending the district court’s denial and thereby opposing the
petitioner’s request. Id. at 835 n.3 (noting the State’s amicus brief
argued that some courts had held that trial courts do not abuse their
discretion by denying an inmate’s name change petition based on a
perceived risk of confusion and record keeping problems at the prison).

While not conceding the point, Professor Woolhandler states that the
citizenship petitions are the “strongest example of non-contentious
jurisdiction.” Woolhandler, Adverse Interests, 111 Nw. U. L. Rev. at
1065.
1
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And after remand to the district court, the State intervened and filed a
brief opposing the proposed name change. See generally Docket, In the
Matter of Name Change of: Cruchelow, Ralph Randall, No. 953900002
(Third Judicial District Court). 2 Based on the numerous docket entries
(indicating discovery requests, expert witness designations, and
briefing), the name-change proceeding was anything but nonadversarial. See id.
Second, even if this case lacks adversariness, it would not
necessarily prevent the Court from exercising jurisdiction. The Court
recently concluded that “adversariness does not completely define the
scope of [its] constitutional power.” In re Gestational Agreement, 2019
UT 40, ¶ 13. Courts may properly perform certain functions, though
entirely non-adversarial, if the framers intended these functions to be
included within the constitutional grant of judicial power. Id. And
that’s the case here, as discussed below in response to the Court’s
second question.
This case therefore does not require the Court to determine the
precise scope of “judicial power” in the Utah Constitution, including the

Available at
https://pubapps.utcourts.gov/XchangeWEB/CaseSearchServlet?_=gyRW
OWiixsI4V5mQbu4YDfu9rnZGrO3VgLjnWVJvMGKvDcOh%2BQqkGh
ttTQ7FK8J6kOBxenuqUX9d%0AZPSDQFaHbLZJ%2FLMVJyeZ.
2
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adversariness issues discussed in Associate Chief Justice Lee’s and
Justice Pearce’s concurring opinions in In re Gestational Agreement.
See id. ¶ 18 n.24 (stating the Court takes no position on Justice
Pearce’s concerns because they were unnecessary to the resolution of
the case).
II.

Statehood-Era Statutes Show the Framers Intended the
Judicial Power to Extend to Cases Like This.
Even though the gestational-agreement statute necessarily

results in a lack of adversariness in those types of proceedings, the
Court held that state courts have jurisdiction to validate gestational
agreements based on the framer’s apparent intent. In re Gestational
Agreement, 2019 UT 40, ¶ 18. The Court pointed to 1884 and 1898
statutes showing state courts had power to preside over nonadversarial adoption proceedings. Id. ¶¶ 14-15. These statutes, the
Court concluded, suggested that “the founders of the Utah Constitution
likely intended the grant of ‘judicial power’ to include, in addition to the
power to hear and decide controversies between adverse parties, the
substantive power over the termination and creation of parental rights
in non-adversarial matters.” Id. ¶ 16. And these statutes “show that the
courts had sufficient power to participate in proceedings that lacked a
dispute between opposing parties.” Id. The Court then reasoned that
7

validating gestational agreements is sufficiently like adoption
proceedings because both involve the creation and termination of
parental rights. Id. ¶ 17. So state courts may properly exercise
jurisdiction to validate gestational agreements based on the historical
evidence. Id. ¶ 18.
That analysis finding jurisdiction despite the lack of
adversariness leads to the Court’s second supplemental question in this
case: “[i]s an application seeking approval of an amendment to a birth
certificate a matter ‘intended by the framers of our constitution to be
included in the constitutional grant [of power] to the judiciary,’” and,
[i]f not, does it resemble other matters our state courts handled at the
time of statehood?” Applying In re Gestational Agreement’s framework,
the answer is yes: statehood-era statutes suggest the framers intended
the courts to have jurisdiction over name-change and similar petitions.
At common law, an individual had the right to change his name
at will. In re Porter, 2001 UT 70, ¶ 8, 31 P.3d 519; In re Cruchelow, 926
P.2d at 834; Smith v. United States Cas. Co., 90 N.E. 947, 950 (N.Y.
1910). Utah, like other states, codified a name-change process that
protects the individual and the public by creating a public record
memorializing the change. In re Porter, 2001 UT 70, ¶ 8; In re
Cruchelow, 926 P.2d at 834; see also Smith, 90 N.E. at 950 (stating
8

“this legislation is simply in affirmance and aid of the common law to
make a definite point of time when the change shall take effect. It does
not repeal the common law by implication or otherwise, but gives an
additional method of effecting a change of name” (citation omitted)).
Utah’s territorial legislature enacted a name-change statute at
least by 1888. That law required “[a]pplications for change of names” to
be “heard and determined by the district courts.” Compiled Laws §
3861. The statute also spelled out the proper district court venue,
petition components, and public-notice requirements. Id. §§ 3862-63.
The district court had to hold a hearing and could question the
petitioner, “remonstrants, or other persons,” under oath about the
application, and then “make an order changing the name or dismissing
the application, as to the court may seem right and proper.” Id. § 3864.
Similarly, in 1898, soon after Utah’s Constitution 3 was ratified,
the legislature codified another name change statute. Revised Statutes
§§ 1545-47. This law again required name-change petitions to be filed
in the “district court” of the county where the applicant lived. Id. §
1545. The petition had to state the proposed name, the reason why a

As originally ratified, Utah’s Constitution specifically prohibited the
legislature from “[c]hanging the names of persons.” Utah Const. art. VI,
§ 26(2) (1896).

3

9

change was sought, and that the petitioner had resided in the county
for a year before filing. Id. The court could then approve the name
change only after giving the necessary public notice and holding a
public hearing at which the petition’s allegations were proven and
“proper cause” given for the name change. Id. § 1546. The statute then
expressly noted that a name change would not affect any “legal action
or proceedings then pending, nor any right, title, or interest
whatsoever.” Id. § 1547.
The current name-change process, including filing in district
court, has remained largely the same since 1898, except public notice is
now left to the district court’s discretion. Utah Code §§ 42-1-1 to -3.
From 1888 to the present, the court order granting a name
change did not and does not approve an amendment to a birth
certificate. Supp. Br. Order at 1-2. Indeed, birth certificates as we know
them did not exist in 1888. No governmental agencies were required to
record births before 1898, though a few cities began voluntarily
registering births in the early 1890s. See Utah Div. of Archives and
Records Serv., Birth Records. 4 Instead, the 1888 statutes authorized,
but did not require, city councils to “regulate . . . the registration of

4

Available at https://archives.utah.gov/research/guides/birth.htm#pre.
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births and deaths.” Compiled Laws § 1755(66). The 1898 code added a
requirement for doctors and professional midwives to keep a register of
births at which they assisted although the register did not require the
child’s name. Revised Statutes § 2029. Every quarter, these medical
professionals had to give copies of their birth registries to the county
clerk, who in turn had to keep his own “register of births” based on the
information provided. Id. §§ 602(2), 2032-33.
But again, the court orders approving name changes did not
automatically amend these birth registries or the subsequently
developed birth certificates. The court orders have always just
approved a name change. The legislature enacted separate statutes
that permitted, but did not require, the individual to take his court
order to the registrar so the registrar could amend the birth certificate.
See, e.g., 1981 Utah Laws 598 (enacting Utah Code § 26-2-11).
That background provides no fair basis to conclude that the
framers intended courts to have jurisdiction over an “application
seeking approval of an amendment to a birth certificate.” Supp. Br.
Order at 1-2. But that does not appear to be the right question anyway
because, as explained, that’s not how the name-change process has ever
worked.
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In the Attorney General’s Office’s view, the question is whether
the instant proceeding “resembles other matters our state courts
handled at the time of statehood?” Supp. Br. Order at 2. It does. As in
In re Gestational Agreement, both the 1888 and 1898 statutes discussed
above “suggest that the founders of the Utah Constitution likely
intended the grant of ‘judicial power’ to include, in addition to the
power to hear and decide controversies between adverse parties, the
substantive power,” 2019 UT 40, ¶ 16, over name-change petitions. And
that power could extend to judicial proceedings to change personal legal
designations such as an individual’s sex. See Utah Code § 26-2-11
(treating court orders granting name- and sex-designation changes the
same for birth certificate amendment process); Appellants’ Br. at 12-18,
26-30 (discussing similarities between name and sex designations).
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should conclude that it has
jurisdiction over this appeal.
III.

Section 26-2-11 Is Presumed to Be Constitutional Unless a
Litigant Proves the Statute Is Clearly Unconstitutional.
The Court’s third question asks whether section 26-2-11 violates

article V or other separation of powers principles. The Attorney
General’s Office respectfully declines to address this issue.
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Based on “fundamental” separation-of-powers precepts, S. Salt
Lake City v. Maese, 2019 UT 58, ¶ 96 n.37, 450 P.3d 1092 (Lee, A.C.J.,
concurring), courts presume Utah’s statutes are constitutional and,
whenever possible, construe them as complying with the state and
federal constitutions. Vega v. Jordan Valley Med. Ctr., LP, 2019 UT 35,
¶ 12, 449 P.3d 31; see also Richards v. Cox, 2019 UT 57, ¶ 12, 450 P.3d
1074 (the Court will “apply a presumption of validity [to a challenged
statute] so long as there is a reasonable basis upon which both
provisions of the statute and the mandate of the constitution may be
reconciled” (quoting Bennion v. ANR Prod. Co., 819 P.2d 343, 347 (Utah
1991)). Any reasonable doubts about a statute’s validity are resolved in
favor of constitutionality, and a statute may not be declared invalid
unless it clearly violates a constitutional provision. Vega, 2019 UT 35, ¶
12. That means “[i]f a party seeking to challenge the constitutionality of
a law enacted by the representatives of the people fails to provide a
sufficient basis for the establishment of a clear constitutional standard,
then the presumption of constitutionality kicks in.” Maese, 2019 UT 58,
¶ 96 (Lee, A.C.J., concurring). But here, no party or other potentially
interested person has challenged the statute’s constitutionality, much
less overcome the presumption of constitutionality.
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Similar separation-of-power concerns also counsel against courts
sua sponte raising issues that the parties have not briefed. As this
Court has described it, the judiciary’s primary function among the
three branches of government is to hear and resolve the matters and
disputes presented as a neutral decisionmaker. See, e.g., In re
Gestational Agreement, 2019 UT 40, ¶ 12 (stating “judicial power . . . is
generally understood to be the power to hear and determine
controversies between adverse parties” (emphasis added and omitted)
(quoting Carlton v. Brown, 2014 UT 6, ¶ 29, 323 P.3d 571)); Vega, 2019
UT 35, ¶ 15 (stating “the core judicial function of courts includes ‘the
power to hear and determine controversies between adverse parties and
questions in litigation’” (emphasis added) (quoting Timpanogos
Planning & Water Mgmt. Agency v. Cent. Utah Water Conservancy
Dist., 690 P.2d 562, 569 (Utah 1984)). In other words, courts adjudicate
rather than litigate matters. So “if a [party] has not raised an issue on
appeal,” an appellate court generally “may not consider the issue sua
sponte.” State v. Johnson, 2017 UT 76, ¶ 48, 416 P.3d 443 (quoting
Allen v. Friel, 2008 UT 56, ¶ 7, 194 P.3d 903). Otherwise, courts become
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more advocate or adversary than unbiased adjudicator. 5 Id. ¶ 40 (“Any
time a judge raises an otherwise overlooked or unargued issue, the
judge arguably undertakes an advocacy role to some extent, as it is the
parties’ duties to raise and argue the issues.”).
The Court has nonetheless outlined some limited situations
where it may appropriately raise issues sua sponte. Id. ¶¶ 48-52. But
none of those exceptions exists here. For example, section 26-2-11’s
validity does not implicate the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction, an
issue that courts can properly raise sua sponte at any time. Johnson,
2017 UT 76, ¶ 50 (explaining that “it is always appropriate for an
appellate court to raise possible issues concerning subject matter
jurisdiction or joinder of a necessary and indispensable party,
regardless of whether such issues were argued on appeal or preserved
in the trial court”); Brown v. Cox, 2017 UT 3, ¶ 6 & n.3, 387 P.3d 1040
(noting the Court may raise jurisdictional issues sua sponte and that it
had asked the parties to brief whether an election code provision
“unconstitutionally expanded this court’s jurisdiction”). The statute
does not raise a jurisdictional question because it outlines only what a

This problem persists regardless of whether the Court takes any
mitigating steps, like supplemental briefing. Johnson, 2017 UT 76, ¶ 40
n.8.

5
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person “may” do after receiving a court order approving a name or sex
change and what the registrar “shall” do upon receiving the change
application (with the court order attached). Utah Code § 26-2-11.
At most, the statute merely assumes that courts have preexisting
jurisdiction to address name- and sex-change petitions. See, e.g., In re
Heilig, 816 A.2d 68, 84 (Md. 2003) (noting that a Maryland statute
similar to section 26-2-11 “does not purport to grant any new
jurisdiction to the Circuit Courts . . . and therefore must be taken as a
recognition that such jurisdiction already existed”). So even if section
26-2-11 were somehow invalid on separation-of-powers or other
grounds, it would not affect the courts’ jurisdiction over name- or sexchange proceedings. See, e.g., Utah Const. art. VIII, § 1 (“The judicial
power of the state shall be vested in a Supreme Court, [and] in a trial
court of general jurisdiction known as the district court . . . .”); id. art.
VIII, § 5 (“The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all
matters except as limited by this constitution or by statute . . . .”); Utah
Code § 78A-5-102(1) (“The district court has original jurisdiction in all
matters civil and criminal, not excepted in the Utah Constitution and
not prohibited by law.”); id. § 42-1-1 (“Any natural person, desiring to
change his name, may file a petition in the district court of the county
where he resides . . . .”); see also Frehner v. Morton, 424 P.2d 446, 448
16

(Utah 1967) (Utah district courts have “jurisdiction of both equity and
law matters”); In re Heilig, 816 A.2d at 85 (concluding petitions to
change a person’s sex designation fall “within the general equity
jurisdiction of the court”).
The absence of any litigant challenging section 26-2-11’s validity
poses another problem. Addressing the Court’s question would require
the Attorney General’s Office to identify and articulate a specific
separation-of-powers concern and then offer a counterargument
explaining why the concern would not actually create a separation-ofpowers violation. That would place the Office in the difficult position of
attacking and defending the statute. And it would do so even though
it’s not immediately clear how the statute poses any separation-ofpowers problems. The statute simply outlines what a person with a
name- or sex-change order must do so that the registrar can in turn
amend the person’s original certificate. Utah Code § 26-2-11. Those
actions do not pose any readily apparent separation-of-powers
problem—let alone one that compels the judiciary to do something it
cannot or should not otherwise do.
For these reasons, the Attorney General’s Office respectfully
declines to substantively answer the Court’s third question.

17

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the judiciary has jurisdiction to
address petitions to change an individual’s name or sex designation.
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/s/ Stanford E. Purser
Tyler R. Green
Utah Solicitor General
Stanford E. Purser
Deputy Solicitor General
Sean D. Reyes
Utah Attorney General
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Salt Lake City, UT 84114
Counsel for the Utah Attorney
General’s Office
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